1 · SolidCash — Aegis guard in Solidity, compiled to BCH
The flagship: the Aegis spend guard (daily limits, freeze, per-tx caps) as a Solidity contract that compiles natively to BCH.
Full port started at 18,750 bytes (undeployable). The lean core — intents off-chain in the XO template, one balance field, require() not custom errors, no events, inlined auth — compiles clean at 8,908 bytes via both solidc and solidhat. Mock suite green: deploy, full flow (create → deposit → spend → freeze → spend blocked → unfreeze → spend → withdraw → over-withdraw blocked, books balance 10,000 − 2,000 − 1,000 − 3,000 = 4,000), owner limit change + stranger rejection, stranger-spend rejection. Honest limit, stated in the repo: deposit credits a declared amount (SolidCash 0.50.0 cannot measure msg.value for deposit-only functions); spends stay capped by the container's real balance, so no funds can be created. Live on Chipnet (Nov 14): AegisBCH at bchtest:rw28k9m5w3wyxptrkj6tx3mw6p4474meqfx596rkaz9eg5jsj2lv5pjm6q5kq (deploy tx fac67a5e…), funded by the tbch.googol.cash faucet. Live flow COMPLETE: create 83429147… → deposit 10,000 ec2b6dfd… → spend 2,000 c789c7af… (over-limit 99,000 blocked by the live preflight) → withdraw 3,000 8ebdba07… → balance 5,000, all four transactions confirmed (8 confirmations). Mainnet waits on the owner.
2 & 3 · XO template — the guard, re-expressed for XO
Same rules, no EVM: the Aegis guard as a BCH template any XO wallet can import.
Template validates structurally (references, CashASM), and the guard flow simulates clean: limit 100, deposit 10, spend 2, over-limit blocked, freeze, spend blocked, unfreeze, spend 1, withdraw 3, over-withdraw blocked, books balance at 4.
Repo: aegis-xo-template ↗Migration map (Aegis.sol → template) ↗
4 · Decentralized Identity — BCH ⇄ Nostr binding
One person, two chains of identity, zero trusted parties: two signatures pointing at each other.
The BCH key signs bch-nostr-binding:<nostr_pubkey>; the Nostr key signs an event carrying the BCH address and that signature. Verification is offline and needs no registry.
5 · Stablecoin Bridge — USDT ⇄ PUSD, executed end to end
The route everyone lists, nobody executes: live quotes on both legs, and the exact transactions to sign.
Leg 1: THORChain (USDT → BCH). Leg 2: Cauldron (BCH → PUSD). Non-atomic by design: if leg 2 fails you hold BCH and retry — nothing is stuck in the bridge.
6 · FoldingCash — pull-based Merkle claims
Folders stop waiting on a trusted monthly push: one Merkle root per month, claim whenever you choose.
Leaf = sha256(hash160(pubkey) ‖ amount), pairs tried in both orders. The pool contract (FoldingPool.sol V5, compiles at 6,191 bytes in the aegis-bch repo) records a claim on the operator's signature and pays it out on the claimant's own signature — double-claims and double-collects blocked. Why operator-approved, stated honestly: on SolidCash 0.50.0 a function that hashes AND writes state fails the derive (proven by a minimal probe after four on-chain-proof versions failed), so the operator verifies the Merkle proof against the published root before signing, and anyone can audit an approval with the contract's public pure verifyProof(). Live on Chipnet (Nov 14): FoldingPool V5 at bchtest:rvpyzut9z2ckw6ryawl6q9hjpsf7jnpf9dwfhmhezwpkdse794cvsyu6rh5sv (deploy tx 0ce114e3…), seeded with 100,000 sats. Live smoke: on-chain leafOf matches the JS leaf, verifyProof accepts the right proof and rejects a wrong one, setRoot abc22459… and claim 5bac2129… broadcast (claim recorded 1,000), collect a9f1388f… — all three confirmed on-chain, 14 confirmations each (the collect waited ~39 min in the mempool while chipnet block production stalled ~332350–332356, then confirmed at tip 332356). Live smoke 6/6 green: collect confirmed, claims[leaf]=0 after collect, claimed[leaf] still 1, the confirmed collect tx pays 1,000 sats to the claimant payout, double-collect blocked, double-claim blocked. The Merkle logic below is the verified part. Roots are per-run (fresh keys each demo).